By David B. Rivkin, Jr.

February 27, 2023, in the Wall Street Journal

Your editorial “Putin Buries Nuclear Arms Control” (Feb. 22) correctly discounts the significance of Vladimir Putin’s withdrawal from the New Start Treaty, explaining that nuclear deterrence is buttressed by U.S. nuclear force deployments and not by arms-control treaties, particularly given Moscow’s frequent noncompliance. Given America’s demanding extended deterrence commitments to defend numerous allies from conventional and nuclear attacks, however, Washington should take several additional deterrence-enhancing steps.

First, deterrence is bolstered by a nuclear-use policy, targeting enemy assets based on the enemy’s own values and weaknesses. This is why the U.S. moved from a “assured mutual destruction” policy, targeting Soviet cities in the 1960s, toward hitting the Soviets where it mattered to them the most. The final iteration of this strategy, adopted during Jimmy Carter’s presidency, targeted Communist Party headquarters and railways linking European Russia with Siberia. Given Mr. Putin’s highly personalized regime, the U.S. contingency plan should be to target Russian leaders and their close associates, as well as the key transportation facilities connecting Russia proper with restive Muslim and Asian regions.

Second, robust U.S. declaratory policy, describing how we view nuclear weapons, enhances deterrence. Unfortunately, visions of a nuke-free world have been overly embraced by numerous administrations of both parties. Given Russia’s embrace of its ability to prevail in a nuclear war, the U.S. must give up on nuclear abolitionism and refocus on a credible nuclear war-fighting strategy.

Today’s challenges require the U.S. to re-emphasize the first-use policy (already embraced by Russian military doctrine) and stress that a properly prosecuted nuclear war can be won. We need to respond robustly to Mr. Putin’s nuclear taunts, stating that any use of Russian nuclear weapons against Ukraine would so malignantly change the post-World War II global security environment that it would be met by a vigorous U.S. response.

Facilitating Russian defeat in Ukraine would also discourage Beijing’s attack on Taiwan. China is rapidly building its nuclear forces but won’t approach nuclear parity with the U.S. until 2030 at the earliest (it’s during these years that U.S. conventional force vulnerabilities in any conflict with China loom largest.) Discounting Mr. Putin’s nuclear threats, abandoning self-deterrence and returning the U.S. to a muscular nuclear policy would bolster deterrence of Beijing, too.

Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-us-nuclear-weapons-deterrence-russia-china-643649ab

Obama let Tehran get into the medical-isotope business, contrary to the intent of Congress.

By David B. Rivkin Jr. and James L. Connaughton

Oct. 12, 2017, in the Wall Street Journal

As President Trump decides whether to certify his predecessor’s nuclear deal with Iran, here’s another wrinkle he should keep in mind: The deal’s implementation violates federal law, namely the American Medical Isotopes Production Act of 2012.

That statute seeks to end the nuclear-proliferation risk associated with foreign production of radioactive substances for medical use using weapons-grade highly enriched uranium. U.S. doctors use a molybdenum isotope, moly-99, in 20 million procedures annually to detect early cancer, heart disease and other lethal illnesses. But the U.S. has no domestic production capability, relying instead on foreign suppliers who obtain the necessary highly enriched uranium from the U.S. government.

In enacting the 2012 law, Congress sought to end exports of highly enriched uranium while ramping up sufficient domestic production of moly-99 to satisfy U.S. needs. Since America uses roughly half of the world’s moly-99, robust U.S. production would cramp the ability of foreign isotope suppliers to control the market and sell their wares globally.

Under the 2012 law, the National Nuclear Security Administration is supposed to implement programs to encourage U.S. entrepreneurs to develop ways of making moly-99 without using highly enriched uranium, with the goal of making enough of it to justify permanently ending U.S. exports of highly enriched uranium. The Obama administration conspicuously failed to fulfill the law’s requirements. Moly-99 is not being produced in the U.S. and the U.S. government continues to export weapons-grade uranium overseas.

The Iran deal makes matters worse. It specifically permits Tehran an unlimited right to generate highly enriched uranium for use in medical isotope production. Iran is free to join with other producers to control supply and price. Earlier this year Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran’s former lead nuclear negotiator and now head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, declared Iran’s intention to become a major supplier of medical isotopes. Most significantly, the Iran deal’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action commits the U.S. and other parties to assist Iranian medical isotope development with technology transfer, project finance, export credits and other forms of investment. The European Union has established a joint nuclear cooperation working group with Iran.

The U.S. cannot in good faith implement these obligations without evading its obligation under the American Medical Isotopes Production Act to curtail such foreign medical isotope production. Under U.S. law, there is no question which obligation prevails. The Obama administration, knowing the Senate would never ratify the JCPOA as a treaty, made it an “executive agreement” instead. Such agreements can have the force of law, but under our Constitution the president cannot unilaterally repeal a statute. It’s another reason the administration should declare the Iran deal null and void.

Mr. Rivkin, a Washington-based constitutional lawyer, served at the Justice Department and White House Counsel’s Office in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. Mr. Connaughton served as chairman of the White House Council on Environmental Quality, 2001-09.

Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-iran-deal-violates-u-s-law-1507847288

By DAVID B. RIVKIN JR. And LEE A. CASEY, Jan. 20, 2015

Nuclear talks between Iran and the U.S. recommenced Jan. 14, ahead of full international talks with senior officials from the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, China and Germany two days later. A final agreement is to be reached no later than June 30. Nothing less than Middle Eastern and global security hangs in the balance.

That security depends on verifiable elimination of Iran’s nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs. Unfortunately, the Obama administration is likely to accept a deal leaving in place a substantial Iranian nuclear-weapons infrastructure, including uranium-enrichment capability, long-range ballistic missiles and the ability to deploy a rudimentary nuclear force on short notice. A course correction that only Congress can effect is urgently needed.

It is difficult for Congress to stop a president determined to sign an agreement with foreign leaders. And as this newspaper pointed out in a recent editorial, President Obama has threatened to veto any legislation to impose further sanctions on Iran if the June 30 deadline is not met. Still, Tehran’s insistence that existing U.S. sanctions be lifted as part of a nuclear-weapons agreement gives U.S. lawmakers substantial leverage. The collapse of oil prices, which dealt a heavy blow to the already weakened Iranian economy, has further increased this leverage. Here is what Congress should do:

First, Congress should insist that any Iranian agreement take the form of a treaty. The Constitution requires that treaties be made only with the advice and consent of the Senate. At the time it was adopted, and throughout most of U.S. history, agreements fundamentally ordering the relationship between the U.S. and foreign nations took the form of treaties, not executive orders. A mere executive agreement, which Mr. Obama may use to evade congressional constraints here, would be constitutionally insufficient. Read more »