March 24, 2015
By MICHAEL B. MUKASEY and DAVID B. RIVKIN JR, February 19, 2015
President Obama last week sent to Congress a draft resolution regarding an authorization for use of military force, or AUMF, against the terrorist group Islamic State. Although presidents have constitutional power to defend American national-security interests, seeking an AUMF is both constitutional and sound. The measure enables Congress to show its support for military efforts and encourages public approval of them. From the nation’s founding, dozens of AUMFs have been enacted. The 2001 resolution authorizing war against al Qaeda and its affiliates and the 2002 authorization of the Iraq war are only the most recent.
AUMFs also have legal significance. They buttress the president’s powers and, consistent with Supreme Court precedent, provide legal support when such aspects of war-fighting as electronic surveillance, detention of enemy combatants and use of deadly force against American nationals who have joined the enemy are challenged in court.
One can argue whether Congress’s constitutional power to declare war serves principally to distinguish formally among enemies, friends and neutrals, or has broader effect. However, AUMFs have become particularly important in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks, as federal courts have involved themselves to an unprecedented degree in scrutinizing such activities. The relevant judicial decisions often cite the existence of an AUMF.
Despite the benefits of traditional AUMFs, President Obama’s proposal is fundamentally flawed. Attempting to obtain political cover for his strategy to fight Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, he has asked Congress to ban “enduring offensive ground operations” and to terminate the authorization after three years.
February 20, 2015
By DAVID B. RIVKIN JR. And LEE A. CASEY, Jan. 20, 2015
Nuclear talks between Iran and the U.S. recommenced Jan. 14, ahead of full international talks with senior officials from the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, China and Germany two days later. A final agreement is to be reached no later than June 30. Nothing less than Middle Eastern and global security hangs in the balance.
That security depends on verifiable elimination of Iran’s nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs. Unfortunately, the Obama administration is likely to accept a deal leaving in place a substantial Iranian nuclear-weapons infrastructure, including uranium-enrichment capability, long-range ballistic missiles and the ability to deploy a rudimentary nuclear force on short notice. A course correction that only Congress can effect is urgently needed.
It is difficult for Congress to stop a president determined to sign an agreement with foreign leaders. And as this newspaper pointed out in a recent editorial, President Obama has threatened to veto any legislation to impose further sanctions on Iran if the June 30 deadline is not met. Still, Tehran’s insistence that existing U.S. sanctions be lifted as part of a nuclear-weapons agreement gives U.S. lawmakers substantial leverage. The collapse of oil prices, which dealt a heavy blow to the already weakened Iranian economy, has further increased this leverage. Here is what Congress should do:
First, Congress should insist that any Iranian agreement take the form of a treaty. The Constitution requires that treaties be made only with the advice and consent of the Senate. At the time it was adopted, and throughout most of U.S. history, agreements fundamentally ordering the relationship between the U.S. and foreign nations took the form of treaties, not executive orders. A mere executive agreement, which Mr. Obama may use to evade congressional constraints here, would be constitutionally insufficient. Read more »
January 22, 2015
David B. Rivkin Jr., and Andrew M. Grossman, January 18, 2015
For years, those who favor restrictions on campaign spending have insisted that their real interest lies in fighting corruption, not limiting political speech. Well, here’s a free-speech litmus test: Can a state block candidates from asking for campaign contributions that are themselves legal?
That’s the issue the Supreme Court will face Tuesday in Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar. Like most states, Florida elects or retains judges by popular vote. Many of those states prohibit judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions. This restriction, supporters say, prevents corruption, bias and the appearance of bias.
It’s hard to see how. Florida’s law allows contributions of up to $1,000 to judicial campaigns, and that limit cannot be significantly lowered (much less banned) without violating the First Amendment. Florida’s law allows judicial candidates to learn who their contributors are and to ask for other kinds of campaign support, including volunteer work and service on their campaign committees.
But a judicial candidate cannot post a request for support on the campaign website, cannot appear before a local civic group to request contributions, and cannot sign a fundraising letter asking for support. In other words, a candidate can accept contributions, just cannot solicit them. But solicitation is just speech.
That last restriction is the one that bit Lanell Williams-Yulee, a public defender and first-time candidate seeking election to a county court. She made the mistake of signing a letter announcing her candidacy and asking friends to contribute whatever they could. For that, she was reprimanded and fined by the Florida Supreme Court. Read more »
January 18, 2015
By DAVID B. RIVKIN JR. And ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY
Law professor Wendy Wagner’s scholarship at the University of Texas captured the attention of the U.S. government, which contracted with her to analyze how federal agencies can better use science in decision making. Unfortunately for Ms. Wagner, her federal contract means that she cannot contribute to any political party, committee or candidate for federal office. So in 2011 she went to court, asserting that the 74-year-old ban on contractor contributions is unconstitutional.
On Sept. 30, the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit heard arguments in Wagner v. FEC. The case provides a much-needed opportunity for the courts to demand strong justification for laws curtailing political speech.
The question in Ms. Wagner’s case is whether the ban on contractor contributions furthers the government’s interest in preventing quid-pro-quo corruption—meaning an exchange of dollars for political favors. This is the only interest considered sufficient to justify limits on political contributions, consistent with the First Amendment, under the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC, and the D.C. Circuit’s own precedent that year in SpeechNow.org v. FEC.
The government contends that banning contractor contributions prevents quid-pro-quo corruption because if contractors could make donations, candidates might return the favor by helping secure a federal contract. The ban’s genesis lies in the Works Progress Administration scandal of the late 1930s, wherein WPA employees and contractors were strong-armed into making contributions to Democrats as a condition of keeping their jobs or contracts. The WPA’s blatant solicitation shocked the nation, leading to the 1939 Hatch Act, which included broad limits on political activity by federal employees. These included a ban on employee contributions to candidates and a ban on contributions by contractors. Read more »
October 22, 2014
Obama’s directive to protect the privacy of foreigners will make Americans less safe.
By Mike Pompeo and David B. Rivkin Jr.
On Jan. 17, in response to former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden’s theft of U.S. intelligence secrets and concerns over the NSA’s bulk metadata collection, President Obama issued a Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-28) that neither strengthens American security nor enhances Americans’ privacy. To the contrary, it undermines our intelligence capabilities in service of a novel cause: foreign privacy interests.
All nations collect and analyze foreign communications or signals, what is known as “signals intelligence.” American technological prowess has produced the world’s most abundant stream of signals intelligence, thwarting plots against the U.S. and saving lives. PPD-28 threatens American safety by restricting the use of this signals intelligence.
First, under the new directive, U.S. officials are required to ensure that all searches of foreign signals intelligence are limited to six purposes: countering foreign espionage, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, cybersecurity, threats to U.S. or allied forces, and transnational crime.
Such policy guidance is appropriate in principle, but these limitations are mere window dressing. Intelligence activities are already heavily scrutinized by executive-branch lawyers to protect Americans’ privacy. Yet the intelligence community must now operate under the presumption that they are somehow engaged in wrongdoing and must justify each and every step by reference to a proper “purpose” to rebut that presumption. This will make intelligence analysts overly cautious and reduce their flexibility in handling security threats.
February 14, 2014