By David B. Rivkin, Jr., Mark DeLaquil, Andrew Grossman, June 15 2015

Note from the Editor:

This article discusses the Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan under the Clean Air Act. As always, The Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy initiatives. Any expressions of opinion are those of the author. The Federalist Society seeks to foster further discussion and debate about the issues involved. To this end, we offer links to other perspectives on the subject, and we invite responses from our audience. To join the debate, please e-mail us at info@fed-soc.org.

Congress’s statement of policy in the Clean Air Act that “air pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments” is not merely hortatory.1 It reflects both the practical reality of and constitutional limitations on federal regulation of air quality. The practical reality is that the federal government relies on the states both for the detailed policymaking necessary to achieve national goals on a state-by-state basis and for the implementation and enforcement of pollution-control programs with respect to particular sources. But, no matter its reliance, the federal government is forbidden from commandeering the states or their officials to carry out federal law, from coercing them to do so, and from invading the states’ own powers. The Clean Air Act resolves this tension through a system of “cooperative federalism” that gives states the opportunity to regulate in accordance with federal goals and provides for direct federal regulation as a backstop should they fail to do so. This accommodation allows the federal government to enlist the states’ assistance in achieving federal goals without exceeding its authority under the Constitution.

The Environmental Protection Agency’s “Clean Power Plan” (the “Proposed Rule”) abandons that careful accommodation and, in so doing, violates the Tenth Amendment and principles of federalism. The Proposed Rule requires each state to submit a plan to cut carbon-dioxide emissions by a nationwide average of 30 percent by 2030. Although ostensibly directed at emissions from fossil-fuel-fired power plants, the Proposed Rule sets targets for individual states that incorporate “beyond-the-fenceline” cuts to be achieved by increasing reliance on natural gas generation, adopting zero-emissions generation such as wind and solar, and reducing electricity demand. The goal is to phase out coal-fired power plants, which currently account for nearly 40 percent of electricity generation.

In the service of achieving EPA’s policy objectives, the Proposed Rule forces each state to overhaul its energy market. Just to keep the lights on, states will have to dramatically change their energy mix, to account for the loss of coal-fired generating capacity, and to rework their regulation of energy producers, power dispatch, and transmission. This will require changes to states’ legal and regulatory structures, as well as numerous regulatory actions directed at their own citizens—energy producers and consumers alike. In order to accomplish these objectives, even a state that declines to implement the Clean Power Plan will have to employ EPA’s “building blocks” to prevent the Plan from wrecking the state’s energy economy. And states that refuse to accede to EPA’s demand to implement this new program face the specter of financial sanctions. In short, EPA’s Proposed Rule forces the states to act to carry out federal policy. It is a gun to the head of the states: “Your sovereignty or your economy” is EPA’s ultimate demand.
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By DAVID B. RIVKIN JR. and ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY
June 11, 2015 7:26 p.m. ET

Declaring that Republican-controlled states have “systematically and deliberately” tried to “disempower and disenfranchise” voters, Hillary Clinton has called for a sweeping expansion of federal involvement in elections. In a speech last week in Houston, laying out what promises to be a major campaign theme, Mrs. Clinton called for automatic voter registration at age 18, a 20-day early-voting period and a maximum 30-minute wait period to vote.

She has also endorsed the idea of a federal law permitting convicted felons to vote and allowing individuals, such as students, who reside in one state to vote in another. All of these federal mandates would augment and make more onerous an unconstitutional election-regulating federal statute known as the “Motor Voter” law enacted during her husband’s White House tenure.

A federal takeover of election laws—and rolling back state voter-ID laws intended to discourage election fraud—is a high priority for progressives. The billionaire financier George Soros reportedly has pledged $5 million to bankroll legal challenges to laws like those that Mrs. Clinton decries. Part of the effort is intended simply to galvanize the Democratic base by stoking a sense of grievance, but the strategy should be taken seriously—and rebutted as unconstitutional.

The Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate federal elections, not state ones. It also distinguishes between the regulation of presidential versus congressional elections. Specifically, under Article I, Section 4—the Elections Clause—while the states have primary responsibility for regulating congressional elections, Congress can pre-empt their rules by regulating “times, places and manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,” except that Congress cannot regulate the “places of chusing [sic] Senators.”

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By DAVID RIVKIN and ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY, March 11, 2015

Last Wednesday, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in King v. Burwell, the latest challenge to the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The case centers on a provision of Obamacare that authorizes federal tax subsidies for individuals only if they purchase health insurance through an “Exchange established by the State.” If an individual purchases insurance through a federal-run exchange (in the event that the state opts out of setting up its own exchange), can she still qualify for Obamacare subsidies? The Obama administration says yes; the King plaintiffs say no. 

A great deal is at stake here. If the plaintiffs win, individuals in 34 states—the states that have opted not to operate a state insurance exchange—will still be subject to Obamacare’s individual mandate, but they won’t qualify for federal tax subsidies. As a result, their insurance will cost more out-of-pocket. Moreover, because individuals in these 34 states won’t get tax subsidies, employers in these states won’t be subject to the employer mandate, so they won’t have to offer health insurance and can’t be taxed for failing to do so. And yet, those states would be able to continue registering their profound opposition to the entirety of the Obamacare regulatory scheme, thereby undermining its legitimacy. Given these consequences, supporters of Obamacare are pulling out all the stops to prevent a plaintiffs’ victory.

One recent attempt to save tax subsidies in these 34 states has come from an amicus brief filed on behalf of four law professors, two of whom are former clerks to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. During the King oral arguments, it became apparent that their argument had found favor with Ginsburg and three other liberal justices and had gained some traction with the court’s centrist, Justice Anthony Kennedy.

Ironically, the centerpiece of their argument is federalism—the division of powers between state and federal governments—a concept that, while a key part of the Constitution’s separation of powers architecture, is not particularly favored by liberals. Specifically, the law professors’ claim that the court should rule in favor of the Obama administration by invoking the “clear statement rule,” a legal doctrine designed to protect state sovereignty.

However, applying this rule to the King case would be unprecedented and deeply antithetical to federalism. Read more »

By Elizabeth Price Foley and David Rivkin, March 3 2015, 11:57am

In Federalist No. 22, Alexander Hamilton observed, “Laws are a dead letter without the courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation.” In constitutional controversies, the judiciary’s role is even more profound. Last week, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, a case that will signal how willing the Court is to prevent separation of powers from becoming a dead letter.

Separation of powers protects individual liberty by preventing any one branch of government from amassing too much power. It also ensures that government functions effectively, by assigning to each branch those powers that are most appropriate to its nature. For example, legislating is best accomplished by a multi-member body that engages in extended debate and deliberation. By contrast, waging war requires timeliness, and is thus best given to a unitary executive.

The Arizona case involves a turf dispute between Arizona’s legislative and executive branches, but it’s unclear if the Court is amenable to refereeing this constitutional conflict.  The case is therefore a canary in the coalmine for “legislative standing,” which means a legislature’s ability to defend, in court, its lawmaking prerogative against executive assault.  This is important not only to Arizona’s legislature, but any legislature, including the U.S. Congress.

At issue in the case is the constitutionality of Proposition 106, a referendum passed by Arizona voters that divested the legislature of drawing the state’s congressional districts and gave that power to an independent commission. When the commission redrew the districts in 2012, the Arizona legislature filed suit, asserting that the commission had violated Article I, section 4, of the U.S. Constitution, stating, “the Times, Places and Manner of holding elections for … Representatives [in the House] shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof .”

Before the meaning of this language can be resolved by the Court, it must first find that the Arizona legislature has standing to sue. In over 225 years of constitutional history, the Court hasn’t definitely articulated when legislative standing is proper. Read more »

By DAVID B. RIVKIN JR. And LEE A. CASEY, Feb. 2, 2015 7:40 p.m. ET

A very public dispute broke out last week when Nevada Attorney General Adam Laxalt went against Gov. Brian Sandoval’s wishes and joined a lawsuit filed by 25 other states challenging President Obama’s imposition of his immigration reform policies by executive action.

Messrs. Sandoval and Laxalt are both Republicans who agree that the current immigration system is broken and that comprehensive reform is necessary. But Mr. Sandoval opposes litigation and has suggested that new immigration reform legislation is the best way to proceed.

Yet on Jan. 26 Mr. Laxalt announced that Nevada had joined the plaintiff states in Texas v. United States of America. “As Nevada’s chief legal officer,” he explained, “I am directed by Nevada’s Constitution and laws to take legal action whenever necessary ‘to protect and secure the interest of the state.’ ”

Mr. Laxalt was right to join the suit. Mr. Sandoval’s legislative path will neither solve America’s vexing immigration problems nor rein in a president who has ignored the Constitution’s limits on executive power.

Texas v. United States of America challenges the president’s use of an executive order to suspend federal immigration laws that require, among other things, deportation of undocumented immigrants and strict limits on who may lawfully work in the U.S. The Constitution requires that the president “Take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” and provides no exemption for laws with which the president disagrees.

As the Supreme Court stated in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), ruling against President Harry Truman’s seizure of the nation’s steel industry during the Korean War, “the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.” Read more »

David B. Rivkin Jr., and Andrew M. Grossman, January 18, 2015

For years, those who favor restrictions on campaign spending have insisted that their real interest lies in fighting corruption, not limiting political speech. Well, here’s a free-speech litmus test: Can a state block candidates from asking for campaign contributions that are themselves legal?

That’s the issue the Supreme Court will face Tuesday in Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar. Like most states, Florida elects or retains judges by popular vote. Many of those states prohibit judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions. This restriction, supporters say, prevents corruption, bias and the appearance of bias.

It’s hard to see how. Florida’s law allows contributions of up to $1,000 to judicial campaigns, and that limit cannot be significantly lowered (much less banned) without violating the First Amendment. Florida’s law allows judicial candidates to learn who their contributors are and to ask for other kinds of campaign support, including volunteer work and service on their campaign committees.

But a judicial candidate cannot post a request for support on the campaign website, cannot appear before a local civic group to request contributions, and cannot sign a fundraising letter asking for support. In other words, a candidate can accept contributions, just cannot solicit them. But solicitation is just speech.

That last restriction is the one that bit Lanell Williams-Yulee, a public defender and first-time candidate seeking election to a county court. She made the mistake of signing a letter announcing her candidacy and asking friends to contribute whatever they could. For that, she was reprimanded and fined by the Florida Supreme Court. Read more »